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INDIRECT RECIPROCITY AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR:  
EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL FIELD EXPERIMENT* 
 
Short title: Indirect Reciprocity and Prosocial Behaviour 
 
     Redzo Mujcic and Andreas Leibbrandt 
        
Some of the greatest human achievements are difficult to imagine without prosociality. This 
paper employs a natural field experiment to investigate indirect reciprocity in natural social 
interactions. We find strong evidence of indirect reciprocity in one-shot interactions among 
drivers. Subjects for whom other drivers stopped were more than twice as likely to extend a 
similar act to a third party. This result is robust to a number of factors including age, gender, 
social status, presence of onlookers, and the opportunity cost of time. We provide novel 
evidence for the power of indirect reciprocity to promote prosocial behaviour in the field. 
 
 
Daily life is difficult to imagine without prosociality: children who never share toys, partners 
who never contribute to the household, friends who never buy birthday gifts, professors who 
never referee, wealthy people who never support the poor, or drivers who never give way. 
The pervasiveness of prosocial behaviour in such widely different everyday human 
interactions suggests multiple underlying motivations. Folk theorems (Friedman, 1971) show 
that such interactions can be explained by self-interest if they are repeated. In addition, 
models of altruism (Andreoni, 1990), reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), and social preference (Levine, 1998; Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) provide 
explanations for prosocial behaviour among strangers where opportunities to reciprocate are 
limited. A large body of experimental research provides insights into the relative importance 
of these motivations in different environments (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Falk et al., 
2008; Leibbrandt and Lopez-Perez, 2012). 
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This paper studies the relevance of a different explanation for prosocial behaviour: indirect 
reciprocity (Alexander, 1987). In contrast to explanations arguing that social comparisons, 
warm glow, intentions, or beliefs trigger prosocial behaviour, indirect reciprocity assumes 
that past encounters affect prosocial behaviour. More precisely, the idea is that you exhibit 
prosocial behaviour because somebody else has exhibited prosocial behaviour towards you 
(upstream indirect reciprocity) or that you receive prosocial behaviour because you have 
exhibited prosocial behaviour towards somebody else (downstream indirect reciprocity). 
There is substantial theoretical work on both types of indirect reciprocity, which shows that 
they can explain prosocial behaviour in large populations that are typical of modern societies 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1989; Kandori, 1992; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b; Leimar and 
Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Christakis 
and Fowler, 2009). However, empirical evidence on the relevance of indirect reciprocity in 
everyday social interactions is lacking.  
Our paper provides initial insights into the role of indirect reciprocity in everyday 
social interactions using a natural field experiment. The chosen field setting represents a 
paradigm of modern societies: it affects many members on a frequent basis, interactions 
mainly take place between strangers, and cooperation is essential to prevent breakdown. We 
investigate prosocial behaviour in the traffic environment of a large urban car park.1 More 
specifically, we study the likelihoods with which drivers give up their right of way and stop 
to help other drivers in two experimental treatments. In the indirect reciprocity treatment, we 
observe the likelihood with which drivers give way to an experimenter after another 
experimenter yields right of way to them. We compare this to our baseline treatment, where 
we simply observe the likelihood with which drivers voluntarily give way to an experimenter. 
By comparing these two treatments, we can infer the relative importance of indirect 
                                                          
1 We are not the first to consider traffic situations as an ideal setting to study reciprocity. For example, Cox 
(2000) provides anecdotal evidence on indirect reciprocity in traffic situations and refers to Jim Engle-Warnick, 
who while riding the bus observed that bus drivers frequently extended courtesies to others on the road. 
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reciprocity as compared to unconditional generosity. At the same time, by capturing the 
details of the traffic environment, we are also able to say something about the robustness and 
motivations underlying upstream indirect reciprocity. 
We find that subjects are more than twice as likely to act generously and stop after 
someone else has stopped for them. Thus, we provide causal evidence for indirect reciprocity 
as a powerful force for motorists to give up their right of way and find it to be more potent 
than unconditional generosity in our field setting. Moreover, we show the impact of indirect 
reciprocity on stopping behaviour to be robust to the level of traffic congestion as well as the 
physical distance travelled since receiving the kind act, and that the stopping rate is not 
affected by the presence of co-passengers. 
Studying indirect reciprocity in everyday situations among strangers is extremely 
difficult. First, it involves a triadic experimental design where experimenters can manipulate 
past social interactions and record the impact on future interactions. Second, it involves 
creating opportunities for indirect reciprocity in a setting where participants can associate the 
link between past and future social interactions. Finally, to show the relevance of indirect 
reciprocity in modern societies where social interactions take place among strangers, it 
involves a design where reputation concerns are limited. 
The contribution of the present study is to test the role of indirect reciprocity in such 
an environment that is typical of everyday life. More generally, we present the first field 
experiment on indirect reciprocity involving actual person-to-person prosocial encounters. 
We are aware of only two recent field studies which attempt to measure the effects of indirect 
reciprocity and other related concepts in the field (Yoeli et al., 2013; Van Apeldoorn and 
Schram, 2016). 
Van Apeldoorn and Schram (2016) examine downstream indirect reciprocity in an 
online platform where participating members can repeatedly ask for and offer services 
(namely, travel tips and guidance) to each other free of monetary charge. The presence of 
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downstream reciprocity is measured by estimating the probability of receiving help (as a 
fellow traveller) after help has been offered by oneself. The authors find that a service request 
is more likely to be granted to member profiles with a positive history of service provision. 
Thus, the accumulated reputation of participants plays a key role in this online community. 
Similarly, Yoeli et al. (2013) test the role of publicity and reputational concerns in 
promoting large-scale prosocial behaviour. In their study, individual residents participate in a 
real-world public goods game by deciding whether or not to support their local energy 
demand response program that is designed to prevent blackouts. The authors implement two 
experimental treatments by varying if local residents can identify which person from their 
building complex signed up for the program. They find that participation rates are three times 
higher in the observable treatment, a finding that is similar to other studies showing that 
making people’s contributions to public goods observable increases overall contribution 
levels (Alpizar et al., 2008; Lacetera and Macis, 2010). 
Our study contrasts with these two studies as we investigate upstream indirect 
reciprocity where individuals help others not because of their reputation but because they 
were helped before. Upstream indirect reciprocity is based on a recent positive experience 
and does not require the decision maker to have any information about the prosocial 
preferences of the person whom she may help. To the best of our knowledge, the employed 
design is the first to capture indirect reciprocity in a natural social interaction between 
strangers who are able to explicitly, and always in real time, experience the kind actions of 
others and then immediately have the opportunity to reciprocate the same act of kindness for 
someone else. We believe that our experimental design studies one of the most common and 
simple examples of indirect reciprocity. 
The observed indirect reciprocity in our setting is consistent with gratitude (Emmons 
and McCullough, 2004; Bartlett and DeSteno, 2006; Grant and Gino, 2010); a ‘sentiment 
which most immediately and directly prompts us to reward’. (Smith, 1976, p.68) Moreover, 
 5 
from an evolutionary perspective, the decision to reciprocate can also be reconciled with self-
interest in the form of misdirected acts of gratitude based on group or societal fitness. In our 
indirect reciprocity treatment, the subject helps others because she has been helped, and 
keeps helping as long as she receives help, leading to increased levels of cooperation. Since 
the anonymous one-shot interactions that we study involve strangers who do not have 
repeated encounters and no effective ways to communicate information about others (i.e., the 
probability of knowing someone’s reputation is close to zero), Rand and Nowak (2013) argue 
that such patterns of upstream reciprocity cannot explain the evolution of cooperation, but 
rather that the concept itself is a by-product of natural selection for reciprocal cooperation. 
That is, since cooperation via direct or indirect reciprocity can be beneficial to human groups 
over time, we may have emotionally internalised such behaviours and may even act in a 
reciprocal manner when the future rewards are unclear. 
The present study also complements field experiments on the role of direct reciprocity 
in bilateral interactions (Gneezy and List, 2006; List 2006; Falk, 2007; Bellemare and 
Shearer, 2009) and laboratory experiments on indirect reciprocity (Dufwenberg et al., 2001; 
Bolton et al., 2005; Greiner and Levati, 2005; Seinen and Schram, 2006; Engelmann and 
Fischbacher, 2009; Servátka, 2009), as well as conditional cooperation (Keser and Van 
Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Croson et al., 2005; Kocher et al., 2008; Martinsson 
et al., 2013).2 Our work is furthermore closely related to experimental studies on indirect 
punishment (Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; Ule et al., 2009; Carpenter and Matthews, 
2012; Balafoutas et al., 2014).  
Overall, the paper has at least two important implications. First, it shows that indirect 
reciprocity can reduce waiting times and affect traffic flow and thus social welfare. Second, it 
                                                          
2 See Charness et al. (2011) for an excellent summary of the experimental literature on indirect reciprocity. For 
laboratory evidence of direct reciprocity, where agents engage in repeated bilateral interactions, see, for 
example, Roth et al. (1991), Andreoni and Miller (1993), Fehr et al. (1993), Berg et al. (1995), Cooper et al. 
(1996), and Dufwenberg et al. (2001). Alpizar et al. (2008) and Shang and Croson (2009) are recent examples 
of field experiments on conditional cooperation. 
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suggests that indirect reciprocity can account for a large share of prosocial behaviour that 
may have otherwise been imprecisely labelled as unconditional generosity. 
 
1. Experimental Design 
We conducted a field experiment in a large metropolitan city in Australia. Figure 1 
illustrates the field setting: a shopping village car park area with more than 350 parking 
spaces that consists of a main road connected to eight side-paths forming seven t-
intersections. The selected shopping village is visited by several thousand individuals each 
weekend from different parts of the city, resulting in a very high turnover of temporary car 
park space occupants. Data was collected on weekends, i.e. Saturdays and Sundays, and 
during the busiest period of the day (between 11am and 3pm) between September 2013 and 
February 2014. 
To measure the presence and relative importance of indirect reciprocity in this 
environment, we used two experimental treatments (baseline and indirect reciprocity), which 
we conducted with the help of experimenters. The baseline treatment captured the average 
baseline level of generosity. The indirect reciprocity treatment captured the baseline level of 
generosity and the additional level of generosity triggered after the subjects experienced a 
generous act. Thus, the difference in generosity across treatments can be attributed to indirect 
reciprocity. We next describe the two experimental treatments in more detail. 
1.1. Baseline Treatment 
Figure 2a illustrates the two-person interaction in the baseline treatment. The 
observed interaction consists of the waiting individual (Experimenter A) and the decision 
maker (Subject). The aim of the baseline treatment was to measure the average level of 
generosity, or prosocial behaviour, by observing the rate at which random passers-by stopped 
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and helped by giving way to our waiting experimenter. Experimenter A was waiting at the 
first t-intersection (Lane 1) when a subject approached (see Figure 1). A binary observation 
was recorded after a subject approached Experimenter A and either ‘stopped’ or ‘did not 
stop’. Observations in the baseline treatment were only counted when the path in front of the 
subject was strictly clear of any other interactions. That is, the subject was not stopped for by 
another driver prior to approaching Experimenter A, and he/she did not stop, or was even 
close to stopping, for someone else from the previous (higher numbered) lanes. This was 
ensured by the waiting Experimenter A and associated research assistants who video recorded 
the interactions.   
1.2. Indirect Reciprocity Treatment 
Figure 2b illustrates the three-person interaction in the indirect reciprocity treatment. 
Experimenter A was again positioned inside the waiting vehicle in Lane 1. The second 
experimenter (Experimenter B) repeatedly entered the main connecting path through the last 
lane (Lane 8) and slowly approached each of the remaining six t-intersections, casually 
observing whether there was a subject waiting to enter the main road. The speed of travel 
undertaken by Experimenter B was 15-30 km/h, as determined by the local car park traffic 
rules and traffic on the main path. The initial interaction between Experimenter B and the 
subject could take place at any of the six available t-intersections (Lanes 2 to 7 in Figure 1). 
This range and natural variation in initial interactions was possible because Experimenter A 
was always positioned and waiting in Lane 1. In each instance, when Experimenter B 
approached a waiting subject, the former was instructed to stop and allow the subject to enter 
the main path. The subject then had the opportunity to reciprocate the same act of generosity 
for Experimenter A, and again we recorded each observation using the binary indicator: 
‘stopped’ or ‘did not stop’. Similar to that in the baseline treatment, observations in the 
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indirect reciprocity treatment were only counted when the subject had no interaction with any 
other drivers, other than Experimenter B, prior to approaching the waiting Experimenter A. 
Experimenters A and B both drove middle-class vehicles throughout the experiment.3 
There were two experimenters, one middle-aged woman and one middle-aged man, and we 
varied the gender of the experimenters by switching their roles. There were no other 
individuals inside the experimenter vehicles. Subject decisions and the surrounding 
environment were recorded by a video camera concealed inside Experimenter B’s vehicle.4 
Experimenters A and B also communicated via mobile phones on speaker to voice record 
each observation. This renders the data collection process transparent and easy to verify when 
viewing the recorded footage and classifying each observation.  
We were able to observe each subject’s decision, gender, approximate age, and social 
class, as well as the weather conditions. In addition, we recorded whether any co-passengers 
were present in the subject’s automobile, as their presence may have influenced the subject’s 
generosity if she expected that her reputation would be affected by her choice. Lastly, we also 
recorded the level of traffic congestion (‘speed of movement’), which was categorised 
depending on the presence of two or more other vehicles being naturally positioned at the end 
of the main path, forcing subjects to slow down as they approached the waiting experimenter. 
This variable also captured the subject’s opportunity costs, as the given field infrastructure 
allowed the subject to quickly go past Lane 1 and simply ignore the waiting experimenter if 
the road was free, and thus save more time than when the road was busy. 
Specifically related to the indirect reciprocity treatment, we also collected information 
on the physical distance between the subject’s initial interaction with Experimenter B and the 
                                                          
3 This classification is based on automobile values taken from RedBook.com.au (a vehicle valuation and 
information source in Australia, which is equivalent to the Kelley Blue Book publically available from the 
United States: www.kbb.com). The vehicles driven by our experimenters (2009 VW Polo and 2010 Toyota 
Corolla) were approximately valued between AUD$15,000 and AUD$20,000. We used the same online 
valuation source to confirm the recorded social class/status classifications of the vehicles occupied by subjects. 
4 During the baseline treatment, the interaction between the subject and Experimenter A was video recorded 
from a vehicle parked close by in the same lane (Lane 1 in Figure 1). 
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waiting Experimenter A (by recording the lane number from which the subject was allowed 
onto the main path). There were six different distances available, in increments of roughly 17 
metres, resulting in measured lengths between 17 metres (if the subject was let in from Lane 
2) and 102 metres (if the subject was let in from Lane 7). This information enabled us to 
study whether the propensity to reciprocate a generous act was dependent on physical 
distance, a proxy for the time elapsed since receiving the favour. 
Even though each subject-experimenter pairing was naturally random (i.e., once a 
subject left the parking area, they were very unlikely to come back and encounter our 
experimenter again), we avoided any potential suspicion raised by anyone monitoring the 
area (for prolonged periods of time) by instructing the experimenters to regularly take short 
breaks between interactions (e.g., by parking the vehicle for some time before entering the 
lanes again). Also, in the case when Experimenter A was denied the kind act and had no new 
subjects approaching, the experimenter would move along and not stay stationary at the t-
intersection for any noticeable amount of time. This procedure was also followed because 
there could have been other visiting commuters waiting to exit Lane 1 behind Experimenter 
A. In any case, given the very large number and turnover of visitors to the chosen area, 
repeated encounters with an experimenter were never an issue. 
 
2. Experimental Findings  
2.1. Descriptive Overview 
Table 1 presents a summary of subject and field characteristics by experimental 
treatment. In total, there were 316 individuals in our sample. Of our subjects, 71% were men 
and 39% were estimated to be mature (>40 years old). A co-passenger was present with a 
47% probability. The weather was clear 77% of the time, and the speed of movement was 
slow during 20% of the interactions. We observed no significant treatment differences in 
gender, age, presence of co-passengers, weather conditions or speed of movement, suggesting 
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that treatment randomisation was successful. Social class, however, was lower in the baseline 
than in the indirect reciprocity treatment (p = 0.013). We control for social class in all of our 
formal regressions. 
 
2.2. The Role of Demographic and Field Variables 
Table 2 provides a detailed look at the generosity rates conditional on subject and 
field characteristics. In the baseline treatment, we observed that speed of movement was an 
important determinant for stopping behaviour. If the road was clear only 4% stopped, 
whereas 56% stopped if the road was busy (p < 0.001, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). In 
addition, we observed that men were statistically as likely to stop as women (18% versus 7%; 
p = 0.130), and that drivers in better automobiles (higher social class) tended to stop more 
often than drivers in less valuable automobiles (20% versus 10%; p = 0.072). We found no 
evidence that the presence of a co-passenger affected stopping. Drivers with co-passengers 
were not more likely to stop than drivers without co-passengers (14% versus 15%; p = 
0.825). Similarly, age and weather conditions did not seem to matter for stopping behaviour 
(p > 0.290). 
The impact of our subject and field characteristic variables was qualitatively similar in 
the indirect reciprocity treatment. In particular, we observed that stopping was much less 
likely if the road was clear than if the road was busy (p < 0.001, Fisher’s exact test, two-
sided). Men were more likely to stop than women, but again this gender difference was not 
statistically significant (34% versus 26%; p > 0.270). There were very small differences in 
the likelihood of stopping conditional on social class (2 percentage points; p > 0.860), while 
age and weather conditions were also unimportant. Interestingly, as in the baseline treatment, 
the presence of a co-passenger had no impact on generosity in the indirect reciprocity 
treatment (p = 0.495). The insignificant impact of the co-passenger variable in both 
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treatments suggests that reputational concerns towards co-passengers are unimportant in these 
environments.5 
Table 3 presents three probit models to further shed light on the role of demographic 
and field-specific variables in the baseline (model 1) and indirect reciprocity treatments 
(models 2 and 3). The most important covariate was again the level of congestion (p < 0.001). 
In addition, we found that the gender difference was more pronounced and robust in these 
models after controlling for the full set of collected variables. Men were much more likely to 
stop both in the baseline (p = 0.012, model 1) and indirect reciprocity treatments (p < 0.010, 
models 2 and 3). Perceived social class had a statistically significant impact on helping 
behaviour only in the baseline treatment, with lower-status individuals being 14 percentage 
points less likely to give way than higher-status individuals (p = 0.005, model 1). Such a 
status effect was not apparent in the indirect reciprocity treatment, with a statistically 
insignificant estimated coefficient (p > 0.150, models 2 and 3). None of the other variables 
were significantly related to stopping behaviour. Model 3 accounted for potential non-linear 
effects of distances travelled on reciprocal behaviour in the indirect reciprocity treatment. We 
did not find that the propensity to reciprocate depended on the physical distance, as none of 
the included distance dummies were statistically significant at conventional levels (p > 0.170 
for each indicator, model 3). 
 
2.3. Overview of Treatment Differences 
Figure 3 illustrates the likelihood of stopping in both experimental treatments and 
visualises the strength of indirect reciprocity. Of the subjects, 14.6% (n = 157) stopped in the 
baseline treatment. In the indirect reciprocity treatment, however, 32.1% stopped (n = 159), 
                                                          
5 One might also argue that reputational concerns are higher in the indirect reciprocity treatment because a car 
(with Experimenter B) was always following the subject. However, in Table 3 (model 1) we find that the 
presence of a car behind the subject (variable Commuter Behind) had no significant impact on the generosity 
rate in the two-person baseline treatment. This provides evidence that the presence of a car behind the subject 
does not explain the treatment difference. 
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and thus the generosity rate increased by 119%, a highly significant treatment difference (p < 
0.001, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). That is, individuals demonstrated a significantly higher 
propensity to act in a prosocial manner after receiving the same positive act. 
 
2.4. Robustness and Drivers of Treatment Differences 
Figure 4 illustrates the robustness of the treatment differences. More precisely, the 
subfigures illustrate the findings with regard to distance travelled in the indirect reciprocity 
treatment (4a), the presence of a co-passenger (4b), speed of movement (4c), and the gender 
of the driver (4d). Figure 4a provides evidence that indirect reciprocity was robust to the 
physical distance travelled, or time elapsed, since being helped. No matter whether the 
physical distance was short (no lane in between, n = 46), medium (one or two lanes in 
between, n = 72), or long (at least three lanes in between, n = 41), the observed act of giving 
was always at a rate over 30% and thus more than twice as likely than in the baseline 
treatment (p < 0.015 for each of the three comparisons). 
Figure 4b shows that the large treatment difference existed regardless of the presence 
of co-passengers. Figure 4c shows that the treatment difference was robust to the level of 
congestion (4% versus 20% stopping if the speed of movement was fast; p < 0.001, n = 253; 
and 56% versus 81% stopping if the speed of movement was slow; p = 0.058, n = 63, Fisher’s 
exact tests). Finally, Figure 4d shows that the treatment difference was significant both for 
men and women (p < 0.025 for each comparison). 
To further test the robustness of the treatment difference, we estimated probit 
regression models in which we regressed the subject’s decision (whether or not to act 
generously) on a dummy variable for treatment, the set of observed characteristics, and their 
interactions. Table 4 corroborates the previous findings and shows that our results are robust 
to the inclusion of demographic and field variables. The estimated marginal effects in Table 4 
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indicate that subjects were on average around 17 percentage points more likely to act in a 
prosocial manner in the indirect reciprocity (IR) treatment compared to the baseline treatment 
(p < 0.001, models 1 and 2). The above estimate is robust to the inclusion of important field-
specific controls, in particular, the speed of movement or busy period dummy, which attracts 
quite a large and statistically significant coefficient. Men were estimated to be 16 percentage 
points more likely to stop than women (p < 0.001, model 2). In the same regression, subjects 
occupying low-status automobiles were predicted to be around 12 percentage points less 
likely to provide the favour than those in higher-status automobiles (p = 0.004, model 2). In 
the final column of Table 4, we included a series of interaction terms between the indirect 
reciprocity treatment dummy and each control variable in order to test for heterogeneity in 
reciprocal behaviour. The insignificant coefficient estimates indicate a lack of between-group 
differences in generosity across the two experimental treatments. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
Theoretical work on indirect reciprocity has received considerable attention in the 
social sciences as it offers an explanation for prosocial behaviour even when interactions 
mainly take place between strangers. Our study provides new field experimental evidence on 
the role and robustness of indirect reciprocity in everyday social interactions. The findings 
suggest that upstream indirect reciprocity plays a crucial role for prosocial behaviour among 
random drivers, as subjects are more than twice as likely to stop for others if someone else 
has stopped for them. 
Our study also provides some insights into the ultimate mechanisms behind indirect 
reciprocity. Most theoretical work assumes that indirect reciprocity is a strategy to build 
reputations and thus driven by self-interest. However, there is also theoretical (Nowak and 
Roch, 2007) and experimental laboratory evidence (Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009) 
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showing that indirect reciprocity is complemented and driven by non-selfish motivations. 
Moreover, while many theoretical models are able to explain downstream reciprocity quite 
well, the same is not true for acts of upstream reciprocity where a person who has just 
received help feels the need to help someone else (see Boyd and Richerson, 1989; Brandt and 
Sigmund 2006). 
Our findings suggest that self-interest plays an important role for prosocial behaviour 
in the given field setting, but that it is unlikely that self-interest is the sole driver for indirect 
reciprocity. In particular, we find that the estimated treatment difference is robust to our 
measures of opportunity costs and reputation concerns. However, we cannot rule out that 
indirect reciprocity is a result of trigger strategies that prescribe stopping for others as long as 
others stop for me (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). Such trigger strategies may also be 
supported by a social norm of stopping, where seeing someone stop and help creates 
awareness of this norm. 
Importantly, our findings are consistent with the idea that received acts of generosity 
affect emotions, which in turn increase the likelihood of generosity (Smith, 1976). Such 
observed acts of misdirected generosity in one-shot anonymous field interactions, where 
unrelated participants gain no future benefits, can be reconciled from an evolutionary 
perspective as a consequence of natural selection for reciprocal cooperation which has over 
time left a mark on human emotions (Rand and Nowak, 2013). Thus, while interacting 
individuals sometimes only witness each other once and have no strong concerns about their 
reputation, they still feel indebted, and are arguably shaped, to pass on such prosocial acts 
received from others to the next person. 
The study reveals some of the first natural field evidence that humans behave in an 
upstream reciprocal manner. Moreover, the general findings confirm much of the existing 
laboratory literature on the presence of indirect reciprocity (e.g., Dufwenberg et al., 2001; 
Greiner and Levati, 2005). While it is difficult to directly compare our field findings with 
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those from the laboratory, our observed indirect reciprocity treatment effect of 119% broadly 
suggests the power of indirect reciprocity for promoting prosocial behaviour in the field to be 
just as high as, and even higher than, inside the lab. 
In terms of collective welfare, we provide evidence that indirect reciprocity can lead 
to higher levels of prosocial behaviour among drivers and hence reduce waiting times. Such 
welfare enhancing effects are perhaps most apparent for agents interacting during busy 
periods when potential idle times can be very long. While the same profound effect sizes may 
not hold in non-busy periods, it still remains a possibility that undisrupted chains of upstream 
indirect reciprocity, beyond our physically-confined experimental ground, would similarly 
lead to reduced downtimes and overall gains in social welfare. That is, while the average 
level of cooperation in the indirect reciprocity treatment is found to be much lower during 
non-busy than busy periods (20% versus 81%), our findings still demonstrate that indirect 
reciprocity boosts prosocial behaviour substantially more during non-busy times (a change in 
the stopping rate from 0.04 to 0.20 for non-busy periods, and from 0.56 to 0.81 for busy 
periods). Indirect reciprocity then leads to as much as a fivefold increase in the level of 
prosociality even at times when the opportunity cost of stopping and helping others is 
relatively high. 
We end with some ideas for future research on indirect reciprocity. First, it would be 
interesting to directly test the role of emotions for indirect reciprocity. Second, it seems of 
crucial importance to know how robust indirect reciprocity is over longer time spans. While 
our finding that indirect reciprocity is robust over a short period of time suggests that indirect 
reciprocity is not simply driven by a reflex to mimic the behaviour of others, we still do not 
know whether indirect reciprocity remains a driving force for prosocial behaviour if, for 
example, meanwhile one has experienced other unrelated kind or unkind acts. Third, it seems 
important to explore potential covariates of indirect reciprocity in the studied and other 
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similar environments. For example, the social status of each interacting agent may determine 
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Fig. 1. Field Setting 
 
Notes. The field experiment was conducted in a large shopping village car park area in the city of Brisbane, 
Australia. The area consisted of a main lane or path that was connected to eight perpendicular lanes (numbered 
from ‘1’ to ‘8’) forming seven separate t-intersections. Experimenter B (top right) would enter the main path 
from Lane 8 and approach each sequential t-intersection, stopping for a potential subject (as identified in 
Lanes 3 and 6, for example) travelling towards the Exit/Destination (marked in the top-left corner). 







(a) Baseline Treatment 
 
 
(b) Indirect Reciprocity Treatment 
 
Fig. 2. Baseline Generosity and Indirect Reciprocity Treatments 
 
Notes. Baseline treatment (two-person interaction) is illustrated in the top panel (a). Here, the left-
hand side subfigure illustrates the initial interaction between the Subject and Experimenter A. The 
right-hand side subfigure illustrates the outcome following prosocial behaviour, in which the Subject 
stops and helps by giving way to Experimenter A. Indirect reciprocity treatment (three-person 
interaction) is illustrated in the bottom panel (b). Here, the left-hand side subfigure illustrates the 
initial interaction between Experimenter B, the Subject, and Experimenter A. The right-hand side 
subfigure illustrates the outcome following upstream indirect reciprocity, in which Experimenter B 
first stops and gives way to the Subject, and then the Subject (recipient of the kind act) stops and helps 








Fig. 3. Generosity Rate, by Experimental Treatment 
 
Notes. The light (white) bar shows the generosity rate (vertical axis) in the two-person interaction 
(Baseline treatment). The dark (grey) bar shows the generosity rate in the three-person interaction 
(Indirect Reciprocity treatment). The observed treatment difference of 119% is statistically significant 
at the 1% level (Fisher’s exact test). 
 
 






























            





















Fig. 4. Robustness of Indirect Reciprocity, by Subject and Field Characteristics 
Notes. Proportion of subjects who decided to stop for the waiting experimenter: (a) by treatment and physical distance from initial interaction, (b) by treatment and co-
passenger presence, (c) by treatment and speed of movement, (d) by treatment and gender. The light (white) bars show the generosity rate (vertical axis) in the Baseline 























































































Table 1  











Notes.  Perceived social class was defined by the type, oldness and quality of automobile driven by the subject. Initial coding and recorded 
video footage was reviewed and verified by research assistants, as well as by using public information available at the online automobile 
valuation authority (RedBook.com.au). Speed of movement (or busy period) = 1 if two or more other vehicles were positioned at the end of the 
main road; forcing the subject to slow down as he/she approached the waiting experimenter. Distance travelled is the (scaled) physical distance 
between the subject’s initial interaction with Experimenter B (where the latter provided the generous act to the former) and consequent 
interaction with the waiting Experimenter A. Relative frequency of distances travelled by subjects since receiving the generous act (for Indirect 
Reciprocity treatment only): Distance 1 (29%), Distance 2 (29%), Distance 3 (16%), Distance 4 (17%), Distance 5 (6%), Distance 6 (3%). 
  Baseline  Indirect Reciprocity 
Variable Description Mean SD  Mean SD 
Gender = 1 if Male 0.72 (0.45)  0.70 (0.46) 
Perceived age = 1 if Mature (> 40 years old) 0.40 (0.49)  0.38 (0.49) 
Perceived social class = 1 if Low 0.53 (0.50)  0.38 (0.49) 
Co-passengers present = 1 if Yes 0.50 (0.50)  0.43 (0.50) 
Weather conditions = 1 if Clear 0.78 (0.42)  0.77 (0.42) 
Speed of movement = 1 if Slow (busy period) 0.20 (0.40)  0.19 (0.40) 
Distance travelled after 
receiving generous act 
= 1 (shortest) to 6 (longest) - -  2.50 (1.36) 























Notes. Test of difference between sample proportions is based on the two-sided Fisher’s exact test. Resulting p-values are reported in the last column for each 
treatment.
 Baseline  
Test of 
difference 
 Indirect Reciprocity  
Test of 
difference 
 n Mean SD  n Mean SD 
Overall 157 0.15 (0.35)   159 0.32 (0.47)  
Males  113 0.18 (0.38)   112 0.34 (0.48)  
Females 44 0.07 (0.25) 0.13  47 0.26 (0.44) 0.27 
Young  94 0.14 (0.35)   99 0.32 (0.47)  
Mature 63 0.16 (0.37) 0.82  60 0.32 (0.47) 0.99 
Low social class 83 0.10 (0.30)   61 0.31 (0.47)  
High social class 74 0.20 (0.40) 0.07  98 0.33 (0.47) 0.86 
Co-passengers present 79 0.14 (0.35)   68 0.35 (0.48)  
Co-passengers not present 78 0.15 (0.36) 0.83  91 0.30 (0.46) 0.50 
Normal speed of movement 125 0.04 (0.20)   128 0.21 (0.40)  
Slow speed of movement 32 0.56 (0.50) 0.00  31 0.81 (0.40) 0.00 
Clear weather  122 0.16 (0.37)   122 0.32 (0.47)  

























Notes. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Probit model. Dependent variable is acted 
generously. The coefficients represent average marginal effects. Robust SEs in parentheses. 
Model (1) corresponds to the baseline treatment, n=157. Models (2) and (3) correspond to 
the indirect reciprocity treatment, n=159. Acted generously = 1 if the subject stopped and 
gave way to the waiting individual (Experimenter A), 0 otherwise. Male =1 if subject was 
male, 0 otherwise. Mature = 1 if perceived age of subject was >40 years, 0 otherwise. Low 
social class = 1 if subject drove low-valued vehicle, 0 otherwise. Co-passengers present = 1 
if other individuals were present inside the subject’s vehicle, 0 otherwise. Busy period = 1 if 
two or more other vehicles were positioned at the end of the main road; forcing the subject 
to slow down as he/she approached the waiting experimenter, 0 otherwise. Clear weather = 
1 if weather conditions were clear/sunny, 0 otherwise. Commuter behind = 1 if another 
commuter was present behind and following the subject (in the baseline treatment), 0 
otherwise. Distance travelled is the (scaled) physical distance between the subject’s initial 
interaction with Experimenter B (where the latter provided the generous act to the former) 
and consequent interaction with the waiting Experimenter A. The shortest possible distance 
(Distance 1) is the omitted reference category.  
 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Male  0.128** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.051) (0.071) (0.070) 
Mature -0.028 -0.027 -0.043 
 (0.039) (0.063) (0.062) 
Low social class -0.140*** -0.086 -0.087 
 (0.050) (0.065) (0.063) 
Co-passengers present 0.022 -0.002 0.009 
 (0.037) (0.063) (0.063) 
Busy period 0.296*** 0.526*** 0.537*** 
 (0.036) (0.055) (0.060) 
Clear weather -0.007 -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.049) (0.068) (0.070) 
Commuter behind 0.051   
 (0.041)   
Distance 2 dummy   0.035 
   (0.078) 
Distance 3 dummy   -0.034 
   (0.104) 
Distance 4 dummy   0.028 
   (0.095) 
Distance 5 dummy   0.117 
   (0.113) 
Distance 6 dummy   -0.293 
   (0.216) 








Table 4  
























Notes.  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Probit model. Dependent variable is acted generously. The coefficients 
represent average marginal effects. Robust SEs are given in the parentheses. Acted generously = 1 if the subject 
stopped and gave way to the waiting individual (Experimenter A), 0 otherwise. Indirect reciprocity (IR) treatment 
= 1 if subject decision was observed under the three-person interaction (indirect reciprocity treatment), 0 if 
otherwise. Male =1 if subject was male, 0 otherwise. Mature = 1 if perceived age of subject was > 40 years, 0 
otherwise. Low social class = 1 if subject drove low-valued vehicle, 0 otherwise. Co-passengers present = 1 if 
other individuals were present inside the subject’s vehicle, 0 otherwise. Busy period = 1 if two or more other 
vehicles were positioned at the end of the main road; forcing the subject to slow down as he/she approached the 





     (1)   (2)   (3) 
IR treatment 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.200* 
 (0.045) (0.038) (0.114) 
Male   0.157*** 0.190** 
  (0.043) (0.074) 
Male * IR treatment   -0.054 
   (0.090) 
Mature  -0.019 -0.040 
  (0.038) (0.065) 
Mature * IR treatment   0.020 
   (0.080) 
Low social class   -0.117*** -0.225** 
  (0.040) (0.080) 
Low social class * IR treatment   0.161 
   (0.104) 
Co-passengers present  0.007 0.044 
  (0.037) (0.058) 
Co-passengers present * IR treatment   -0.046 
   (0.075) 
Busy period  0.419*** 0.488*** 
  (0.029) (0.077) 
Busy period * IR treatment   -0.102 
   (0.111) 
Clear weather    -0.014 
   (0.041) 
N 316 316 316 
